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Abstract: The right of indigenous self-determination is now accepted at
both the national and international level, but the exercise of the right to
self-determination does not connote any specific institutional arrangement.
This chapter, from the forthcoming book, Indigenous Peoples and the
Law: Comparative and Critical Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Oxford),
describes a variety of arrangements in Australia, Canada, New Zealand
and the United States. Indigenous people have the greatest political
autonomy in the sovereignty/self-government model found in the United
States and in the latest self government agreements from Canada. The selfadministration/self-management model provides for indigenous entities to
deliver social services and educational services to their own communities.
The co-management/joint management model provides for indigenous
participation in the management of lands and resources. Finally, there are
arrangements that provide for participation in public government. An
example would be the guaranteed Maori seats in the legislature in
Aotearoa/New Zealand.
The chances of success for these initiatives are increased by ensuring that
community member participate in the design and delivery. A scheme
imposed from above will likely run into problems. During the period of
implementation it is important to address issues relating to the
identification of the appropriate group, the accountability of the
indigenous institution to its own members and the role of women.
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INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE STATE
Shin Imai*

I. INTRODUCTION
One of my clients in the mid-eighties was a First Nation located in
northern Canada. To get to the reserve, I had to take a two-hour flight
from Toronto to a small town by jet, stay over night, and board a
connecting flight on an eight-person prop the next morning. The reserve
was located on an island in the middle of the wilderness. There were no
roads or railways within hundreds of miles. When the plane landed I could
see nothing but a carpet of scrub broken only by the small paved landing
strip and a dusty road heading off to the village. An invisible line
separated provincial Crown land, where the landing strip was located,
from federal Crown land, where the Indian reserve was located.
The elders of the community were concerned about a growing
alcohol problem among the youth. Their worries came to a head when a
young man was found frozen to death in the woods after drinking. After
hearing from the elders, the Chief and Council enacted a law banning
liquor on the reserve. There was a straightforward way to enforce the
prohibition and stem the flow of alcohol. The only entry into the reserve
was by plane, so it would be easy to search the luggage of the passengers,
as the plane was unloaded. The First Nation asked the police constable
who was stationed in the community to search the luggage of all the
passengers and confiscate all liquor.
There was a legal problem with this idea. Because the plane landed
on provincial land, only provincial law applied. The police constable, who
was appointed by the Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police, was
told by his superiors that he could search people's personal belongings
only if there were reasonable and probable grounds that a crime was being
committed. Possessing liquor was legal on provincial land. Therefore,
when the person got off the plane, there was no crime, and there were no
*
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grounds to perform a search. This meant that a search could only be
conducted once the individual set foot on federal reserve land, where the
possession of liquor was illegal. But there was a practical problem with
this idea. There was no fence demarcating the boundary and there was no
easy way to police the crossing of the invisible line between provincial
and federal land.
The Chief was frustrated, and decided to appoint his own
‘peacekeepers’ from the First Nation to search all the passengers as they
unloaded their luggage off the plane. Most passengers co-operated with
the peacekeepers, but during one of these searches a community member
objected to the search. A scuffle followed, and liquor was found in the
community member's bag. It was confiscated and destroyed by the
peacekeepers. No other action was taken against the individual. The
community member, however, was outraged and complained to a legal aid
clinic located in the nearest town, which was an hour and half away by air.
The clinic lawyer felt that the search was illegal, as the search occurred on
provincial land. Therefore, in the eyes of the law, the peacekeepers were
no more than private citizens who had no right to search the belongings of
other private citizens. The lawyer helped the community member lay a
criminal information against the two peacekeepers, and they were charged
with assault.
A variety of ‘legal’ work-arounds were canvassed to address this
problem. The most obvious solution was to make sure that the airstrip was
located on federal reserve land. The province, however, refused to transfer
the airstrip to the federal government, and the federal government would
not consider paying for a new airstrip on its own land. Another proposal
was for the Band to construct a huge fence around the airstrip and force
individuals to pass through a gate. Poets and cartoonists would
immediately see the comic potential of constructing such a fence in the
middle of a wilderness, to circumvent a problem created by an invisible
and meaningless boundary. Some government lawyers, alas, had less of a
sense of humour, and actually suggested the fence as an appropriate
solution. Unfortunately, or fortunately, neither the federal nor the
provincial government would pay for such a fence. In the end, the matter
was never resolved. The charges against the individual peacekeepers were
quietly dropped. The federal- provincial boundary has not changed, and
the challenge of enforcing the prohibition on liquor continues.
Aboriginal communities across Canada have similar stories,
featuring laws that are appropriate for urban areas in the south, but are
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imposed in ludicrous ways in the remote north. For example, Susan
Drummond recounts a story of an Inuk youth who was tried by a judge in
a city in the south for a violent crime. The judge's solution was to sentence
the youth to return to his isolated northern community. The northern
community was just as worried about the youth in their community and
incarcerated him on his arrival. The southern judge ordered the youth
released and threatened to have community members charged with
kidnapping.1
In the two stories recounted above, the Criminal Code operated in
a way that was counterproductive to community protection. In the first
story, the Criminal Code helped protect the bootleggers by making
prosecution and detection very difficult. In the second story, the
mainstream justice system dealt with a problem youth in a southern
community by moving him back to his isolated northern community.
Exposing the northern community to potential problems protected the
southern community. More serious, however, was the fact that the
application of the Criminal Code in both cases disempowered the leaders
of the community and placed the authority and responsibility for dealing
with internal issues in the hands of non-Aboriginal people from the south.
I thought of these stories after reading Citizens Plus: Aboriginal
Peoples and the Canadian State, by Canadian political scientist Alan
Cairns.2 In this book, he criticizes Canada’s Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples3, which recommended that governments enter into
negotiations with Aboriginal nations in order to increase the Aboriginal
land base and to recognize lawmaking powers in their own communities.
Cairns says that these agreements emphasize ‘nation to nation’
relationships, treaties and a third order of government for Aboriginal
nations at the expense of fostering a ‘common sense of belonging’ through
shared institutions with other Canadians. In the two communities
described above, I wondered how it could be said that the application of
the ‘shared’ Criminal Code fostered a ‘sense of belonging’ to Canada?
From the point of view of the dominant, non-Aboriginal society, having
1
2
3

S Drummond, Incorporating the Familiar: Investigating Legal Sensibilities in
Nunavik (Queen’s University Press, 1997).
A Cairns, Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State (UBC
Press, 2000) 51-2.
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report (Supply and Services Canada,
1996). (‘Royal Commission, Report’). One of the complaints made by Cairns is
that the majority of the seven Commissioners were Aboriginal.
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the same Criminal Code apply on and off reserve may have appeared to
strengthen the connection to Canada. From the Aboriginal point of view,
however, the ‘sense of belonging’ may not have been felt as a particularly
positive experience and would likely have contributed to a further
alienation from Canada.

II. OVERVIEW OF SELF-DETERMINATION
A. THE NEED FOR SELF-DETERMINATION
In Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, Indigenous
people have survived a very dark century when government policy was
aimed at destroying their cultures and taking away their lands.
A low point was reached in Canada in 1969, when then Prime
Minister Pierre Trudeau released the White Paper on Indian Policy. This
initiative called for the legal termination of Indian status, dismantling of
Indian reserves, repeal of the Indian Act, and amendment of the
Constitution to eliminate federal jurisdiction over Indians. The White
Paper referred to Indian claims to land as ‘so general and undefined that it
is not realistic to think of them as specific claims capable of [legal]
remedy’.4 Trudeau apparently thought that he was doing nothing more
than formally announcing what had already happened – the disappearance
of the Indian. Much to his surprise, he was set back on his heels by the
angry reaction of First Nations, and by court rulings recognizing
Aboriginal title. His government had to do an about-face and institute a
policy that addressed land claims and Aboriginal title.
Similar developments occurred in the other jurisdictions. In New
Zealand, after years of hostility to Māori, the government enacted the
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 that provided legislative recognition of the
1840 Treaty and establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal. The Tribunal,
which incorporates both Māori and pakeha (non- Māori) personnel and
procedures, has launched a series of hearings looking into land, resource
4

Quoted in P Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada
(University of Toronto Press, 2001) 268.
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and cultural rights of Māori.5 In Australia, a 1967 referendum approved
changes to the Constitution that allowed the Commonwealth (federal)
government to make laws with respect to Aboriginal people, and ensured
that they would be taken into account for calculating state populations. In
the 1970's the government began a policy favouring self-determination or
self-management6, which has continued off and on since that time. The
United States began the era of self-determination with President Richard
Nixon’s speech in 1970, which opened the way for the Indian SelfDetermination and Educational Assistance Act in 1975. This Act provided
a mechanism for transferring responsibility for federal programs to tribes.7
These changes occurred partly because non-Indigenous
governments realized that the era of assimilation had not worked.
Indigenous people had survived massacres, European diseases, forced
removal of their children and mass deportation out of their homelands.
The ‘Indian problem’ had not disappeared: instead, the assimilation policy
had exacerbated the problems and governments were left with the prospect
of social and economic disaster in Indigenous communities. Indigenous
people themselves impelled the change by joining the wave of
consciousness that began in the Sixties. In 1966, in Australia, Vincent
Lingiari led 200 fellow Aboriginal workers in the Wave Hill ‘Walk-Off’.
What began as a protest for the same pay as non-Indigenous employees
turned into a seven year strike for the return of Aboriginal lands.8 In the
United States the Trail of Broken Treaties was a caravan that departed
from the West Coast in 1972. It traveled to various reservations, gaining
support, before finishing in Washington DC, where Indians occupied

5
6
7

8

J Hayward and NR Wheen (eds), The Waitangi Tribunal (Bridget Williams
Books, 2004)
C Gibson, ‘Cartographies of the Colonial/Capitalist State: A Geopolitics of
Indigenous Self-determination in Australia’ (1999) 31 Antipode 45, 47.
See G Nettheim, GD Meyers and D Craig, Indigenous Peoples and Governance
Structures: A Comparative Analysis of Land and Resource Management Rights
(Aboriginal Studies Press, 2002) 32; The Harvard Project on American Indian
Economic Development, The State of the Native Nations (Oxford University
Press, 2008) 20-1 (‘The Harvard Project’). For a review of economic
development in Canada, see C Beal, “Aboriginal Economic Development” in G
Bailey (ed), Indians in Contemporary Society (Smithsonian Institution, 2008)
231.
National Archives of Australia, Fact Sheet 24, at www.naa.gov.au/aboutus/publications/fact-sheets/fs224.aspx.
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offices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.9 In Canada, a Native Peoples
Caravan traveled across the country in 1974 and they were confronted by
riot police on the steps of Parliament in Ottawa.10 In 1975, Whina Cooper
led Māori in the Land March under the slogan ‘not one more acre more of
Māori Land’. The march began in the north part of the country and arrived
in Wellington with 30,000 supporters.11
It is now clear that there are sound economic and social reasons
for promoting self-determination. The Harvard Project on American
Indian Economic Development has conducted a series of studies beginning
in 1987 culminating in the publication of The State of the Native Nations.
They show that self-determination and economic prosperity are
inextricably linked. They reveal that poverty levels dropped on United
States reservations exercising self-government powers, at a greater rate
than poverty levels dropped in the general population. The studies also
found that with greater self-government, leaders are more accountable to
the members of the community and that their decisions are more likely ‘in
tune with the cultural values of the community’.12 Stephen Cornell, the cofounder of the project, is forthright in his view:
the U.S. record is clear: if central governments wish to
perpetuate Indigenous poverty, its attendant ills and
bitterness, and its high costs, the best way to do so is to
undermine tribal sovereignty and self-determination. But if
they want to overcome Indigenous poverty and all that
goes with it, then they should support tribal sovereignty
and self-determination, and they should invest in helping
Indigenous peoples build the governing capacity to back up
sovereign powers with effective governments of their own
design.13
9
10
11
12
13

V Deloria, Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of
Independence (Delacorte Press, 1974).
V Harper, Following the Red Path (Native Peoples’ Press, 1979).
SC Bourassa and AL Strong, ‘Restitution of Land to New Zealand Maori: The
Role of Social Structure’ (2002) 75 Pacific Affairs 227, 237.
The Harvard Project, above n 7, 70. For the website of the project, see
www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied.
S Cornell, Indigenous Peoples, Poverty, Self-Determination in Australia, New
Zealand, Canada the United States (Native Nations Institute for Leadership,
2006) 28.
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The social basis for a self-determination policy is also sound. Michael
Chandler and his colleagues have conducted a series of interesting studies,
trying to understand why some suicide rates on Indian reserves in British
Columbia, Canada, were 800 times the national average, and on others,
suicide was practically unknown. Their conclusions are remarkable. They
find that suicide rates are lower in communities that have retained their
own language. In addition, Bands have higher rates of youth suicide when
they lack measures of self-government over areas such as health,
education, child protection, policing, access to traditional lands, and the
construction of facilities for preserving cultural artifacts and traditions.14
Claire Charters, in her chapter, discusses the growing recognition
of the self-determination rights of Indigenous peoples at the international
level. The most recent is the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous People, Article 3, which recognizes the right to selfdetermination: ‘Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development’.15

B. WHAT IS SELF-DETERMINATION?
A wide variety of terms are used to describe the general policy approach
described in this chapter. A Māori commentator from Aotearoa/New
Zealand says:
Maori aspiration for greater control over their own
destinies and resources is variously described as a search
for sovereignty, autonomy, independence, self-governance,
self-determination, tino rangatiratanga, and mana
motuhake. There are important distinctions between those
terms, though they all capture an underlying commitment
to the advancement of Maori people as Maori, and the
14

15

D Hallett, MJ Chandler and CE Lalonde, ‘Aboriginal Language Knowledge and
Youth Suicide’ (2007) 22 Cognitive Development 292, 292. The first study on
cultural continuity was MJ Chandler and CE Lalonde, ‘Cultural Continuity as a
Hedge Against Suicide in Canada's First Nations’ (1998) 35 Transcultural
Psychiatry 191.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, GA Res
A/RES/61/295, UNGA, 61st Sess (Sept 13, 2007).
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protection of the environment for future generations. And
all reject any notion of an assimilated future. 16
Agreement on terminology is rendered more difficult because Indigenous
and non-Indigenous parties may formulate the problem in entirely
different ways. Non-Indigenous governments and courts tend to analyze
the issue in relation to relative powers and jurisdictions. What laws will
Indigenous people be able to enact? Will Indigenous laws be subservient
to federal laws? What institutions will be established to implement
policies? Indigenous parties, on the other hand, tend to view the issues in
terms of on-going resistance to the encroachment of non-Indigenous
social, economic and political structures.17 Their approach to selfgovernment may be better understood as a ‘bundle of dynamic legal
relationships, political aspirations and affirmations of cultural
continuity’.18
The difference in these approaches may be illustrated by
comparing the Canadian government’s negotiation policy on selfgovernment, with the approach of Canadian Aboriginal academic John
Borrows. The federal government policy recognizes that there is an
inherent right of self- government and sets out what areas of jurisdiction
are negotiable, whom the government will negotiate with, and how
negotiated agreements are to be ratified. A major objective is to harmonize
laws: ‘it is in the interest of both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal
governments to develop co-operative arrangements that will ensure the
harmonious relationship of laws which is indispensable to the proper
functioning of the federation’.19 Borrows, on the other hand, in ‘A
Genealogy of Law: Inherent Sovereignty and First Nations Selfgovernment’, recounts his family history going back to the great Shawnee
16
17

18
19

M Durie, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self-determination
(Oxford University Press, 1998) 218.
See F Barth, ‘Preface, 1998’ in F Barth (ed), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries:
The Social Organization of Culture Difference (Waveland Press, 1969, 1998) 7
(‘... in analysing Indigenous people’s political activism, we discussed the shift to
seeing such groups as engaged in a social struggle for meaningful change, not
the revitalization of an unchanging heritage of aboriginal cultural traits’.).
S Imai, Aboriginal Law Handbook (2nd edn, Carswell, 1999) 116. (‘Imai,
Handbook’)
See ‘The Government of Canada's Approach to Implementation of the Inherent
Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government’ (‘federal selfgovernment policy’), at www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/pub/sg/plcy_e.html.
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leader, Tecumseh, who fought with the British against the Americans
during the War of 1812. Borrows points out that Tecumseh fought as an
ally to the British, not as a subject, with the objective of protecting Indian
lands. Borrows talks about a great-great-grandmother who was a medicine
woman and who kept alive the traditions of her people. He talks about
other ancestors who converted to Christianity and signed treaties, and
relates this history to the present-day actions of the Chippewas of the
Nawash Band Council. Through all this, he shows how the Indigenous
people asserted their autonomy in the face of huge pressures. Of his
methodology, Borrows says
the term ‘self-government’ does not require a legal or
technical definition because I do not refer to selfgovernment as an abstract, futuristic institution. I identify
self-government with particular events in which our people
have exercised specific instances of control in their internal
and external societal relationships.20
Of course, the federal policy and the reflections by Borrows are not
comparable because they were drafted for different purposes. But that is
precisely the point. The parties may come to the negotiating table for very
different purposes, making communication a challenge.
The difference between the parties does not lie only in the different
expectations of the process. The parties may also conceptualize
‘difference’ itself in different ways. Non- Indigenous governments
generally see this ‘difference’ as a set of static practices, some of which
can continue today and others that are of no relevance in the contemporary
world. Much of the current judicial thinking on ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ is
also static and judgmental. It is based on the view that cultural practices
and beliefs can be taken apart and catalogued into ‘integral’ and
‘incidental’ value to the social group. For example, in the Supreme Court
of Canada decision, R v Van der Peet, Lamer CJ thought that it was
reasonable to ask Aboriginal groups to demonstrate that a pre-contact
‘practice, tradition or custom was one of the things which made the culture
of the society distinctive – that it was one of the things that truly made the

20

J Borrows, ‘A Genealogy of Law: Inherent Sovereignty and First Nations Selfgovernment’ (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 291, 294.
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society what it was’.21 He felt that it would be possible to do this while
excluding those practices that ‘are true of every human society (e.g.,
eating to survive)’.22 This approach has been criticized by John Borrows
for freezing Aboriginal societies in the past:
Chief Justice Antonio Lamer has now told us what
Aboriginal means. Aboriginal is retrospective. It is about
what was, ‘once upon a time’, central to the survival of a
community, not necessarily about what is central,
significant and distinctive to the survival of these
communities today. His test invites stories about the past.23
The static view of culture arose at a time when societies were viewed
hierarchically with some cultures being more advanced than others - some
so low on the scale of human development that they deserved to be
enslaved or exterminated. Modern anthropology no longer subscribes to
those views. Culture is not a static group of attributes that can be placed in
a hierarchical order, but rather a dynamic, ever changing complex of
relationships. Commenting on the Van der Peet decision, anthropologist
Michael Asch says: ‘culture is a system and a process rather than merely
items and arrangements. It is inappropriate to attempt to ferret out whether
a practice, custom or tradition is “distinctive”’.24
This dynamic experience of culture may be why many Indigenous people
are attracted to the concept of ‘self-determination’. It refers to the right of
a people to decide how it wants to relate to a majoritarian population. As
21
22

23

24

[1996] 2 SCR 507, para 55.
Ibid, para 56: ‘The court cannot look at those aspects of the aboriginal society
that are true of every human society (eg, eating to survive), nor can it look at
those aspects of the aboriginal society that are only incidental or occasional to
that society; the court must look instead to the defining and central attributes of
the aboriginal society in question’. Subsequent cases, including Sappier v The
Queen [2006] 2 SCR 686, have backtracked a little from this position.
J Borrows, ‘Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the
Trickster’ 22 American Indian Law Review 37, 43. A similar observation for the
Inuit is made by Drummond, above n 1, 42 (‘Fixing Inuit culture at the period of
the ethnographer’s fieldwork ignores the unceasing dynamism of groups that are
constantly forming and reforming in the grip of the contingencies of time. Such
ahistorical depictions prevent the Inuit from sharing the present with us’.).
M Asch ‘The Judicial Conceptualization of Culture after Delgamuukw and Van
der Peet’ (2000) Review of Constitutional Studies 119, 129.
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understood in international law, it does not say what form the association
will take. Technically both the option of full sovereignty and the option of
complete assimilation are open. ‘Self-determination’ refers to a choice, not
a particular institutional relationship. It is dynamic and not fixed on
particular arrangements. In the next section, I will discuss four possible
outcomes from the exercise of self-determination: sovereignty and selfgovernment; self- administration and self-management; co-management
and joint management; and participation in public government.

III. THE EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION
Because self-determination is a choice, it can be exercised in different
ways. The ‘sovereignty and self-government’ option leads to more
autonomy for the Indigenous community to control its own social,
economic and political development. The ‘self-management and selfadministration’ option leads to greater control of local affairs and the
delivery of services within a larger settler government legislative
framework. The ‘co-management and joint management’ model
institutionalizes Indigenous participation in the management of lands and
resources. The ‘participation in public government’ option provides a
means to influence the policies of the settler governments through
Indigenous-specific institutions. Within each category, there are a number
of variations. These options are not mutually exclusive and in some
jurisdictions, all four forms co-exist.

A. SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT
In no jurisdiction does use of the term ‘sovereignty’ connote the existence
of a separate international state. Rather, the sovereignty and selfgovernment models are characterized by the recognition of an inherent
Indigenous authority to make laws over a defined territory. These
Indigenous governments do not rely on delegated authority from settler
government legislation. This does not mean that domestic courts recognize
that Indigenous nations have plenary authority. In both the United States
and Canada, courts and legislation have imposed limitations on the
autonomy of these governments.

12
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1. THE UNITED STATES
Indian tribes in the United States have the most explicit recognition of
their autonomy. Since 1821, the Supreme Court of the United States has
described the tribes as ‘domestic dependent nations’,25 and recognized
their prior possessory rights to their territory. As one notable case
explained: ‘[t]he Indian nations had always been considered as distinct
independent political communities, retaining their original natural rights,
as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial’.26 This
means that the tribes derive their authority independently of the
Constitution of the United States, and only Acts of Congress can limit
their authority.
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique
and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of
Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until
Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign
powers. In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.27
The most significant Congressional incursion has been the Major Crimes
Act,28 of 1885, which gives the federal courts jurisdiction over more than a
dozen offences such as murder, kidnapping and rape. Other statutes that
limit tribal authority include the Indian Civil Rights Act,29 which gives
individual Indians recourse against their tribal governments for violation
of their civil liberties; and Public Law 280,30 which transferred some
federal authority to about sixteen states in 1953. Nonetheless, the ‘doctrine
of retained sovereignty’ has survived. Therefore, in the absence of
Congressional legislation, the tribes can enact their own laws and
administer their own justice system. Today, tribal codes cover a wide
25
26
27
28
29

30

Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US (5 Pet) 1, 17-20 (1821).
Worcester v Georgia 31 US (6 Pet) 515, 559 (1832).
US v Wheeler, 435 US 313, 322-23 (1978).
Major Crimes Act, 18 USC s 1153.
Indian Civil Rights Act 1968, 25 USC ss 1301. This statute is necessary because
the sovereign status of tribal governments means that they do not derive their
powers from the American constitution. Consequently, the Bill of Rights
contained in the American constitution does not apply to tribal governments.
Pub L 83-280, 67 Stat 588 (1953).
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range of subject matter including criminal offences not covered by the
Major Crimes Act, commercial relations, land use, marriage and child
welfare.31 There are about 275 tribal courts in the United States and many
tribes have courts of appeal.32 The extent to which tribal jurisdiction
extends to non-Indians has been litigated several times in the Unites States
Supreme Court. The current law, in a nutshell, is that in most cases the
tribal jurisdictions do not apply to non-Indians.33
FROM THE MID SEVENTIES ONWARD, CONGRESS PASSED A NUMBER OF LAWS
THAT ENCOURAGED GREATER EXERCISE OF TRIBAL POWERS. THE MOST
SIGNIFICANT, IN TERMS OF THE RECOGNITION OF TRIBAL AUTHORITY, WAS
THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978. THIS ACT EXPLICITLY
RECOGNIZES TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN CHILDREN RESIDING ON
RESERVATIONS, AS WELL AS PROVIDING FOR THE TRANSFER OF
JURISDICTION OVER INDIAN CHILDREN LIVING OFF THE RESERVATION FROM
STATE TO TRIBAL COURTS. IN CASES WHERE THERE IS NO TRANSFER, THE
34
STATUTE GIVES THE TRIBE THE RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THE PROCEEDINGS.
2. CANADA
Prior to 1982, the Canadian government and courts did not acknowledge
that Indigenous peoples have inherent government powers. The only
authority granted to Indians was through the Indian Act, which established
elected Band Councils which could only enact by-laws on local matters.
The other two Indigenous peoples in Canada, the Inuit and the Métis,

31

32

33

34

For a description of tribal jurisdiction see DH Getches, CF Wilkinson and RA
Williams Jr, Cases and Materials on federal Indian Law (5th edn, West
Publishing, 2005) 456-54; and The Harvard Project, above n 7, 37-51.
These courts generally follow American adjudication processes but many are
introducing traditional peacekeeper functions. See National Tribal Resource
Centre, www.tribalresourcecenter.org/tribalcourts/history.asp; and the chapter in
this reader by Christine Zuni Cruz.
The leading case limiting tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is
Oliphant v Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 US 191 (1978). For a recent case
limiting civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, see Plains Commerce Bank v Long
Family Land & Cattle Co, 554 US ___ (2008).
Indian Child Welfare Act, 1978, 25 USCA, s 1911.
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faired even worse as there was almost no formal recognition of their
existence as collectivities.
In 1982, Canada amended its Constitution. Among other things, it
added a provision recognizing rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada:
s.35(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized
and affirmed.
(2) In this Act, ‘aboriginal peoples of Canada’ includes
the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.35
Although no rights were specifically mentioned, the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal Peoples, in its 1996 report, reasoned that a right of selfgovernment was already included in section 35(1).36 While the Supreme
Court of Canada has yet to decide whether this is correct, it has held that
assertion of a general right of self-government over reserve land is too
broad; instead, self-government rights need to be proven on a specific,
case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, the Court has decided that, in cases
involving Aboriginal title and treaty rights to fish, Aboriginal peoples have
some decision-making authority.37
In the meantime, the federal government has committed itself to
recognizing the existence of the inherent right to self-government. Based
on the federal self-government policy, negotiations have continued on land
claims and self- government. Over a dozen significant agreements have
been signed since the mid seventies, as well as scores of minor settlements
for land disputes. The land portions of these agreements range from

35
36
37

Constitution Act 1982, being Sch B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) s 35.
See Royal Commission, Report, above n 3, Vol 2 Pt 2, 245-65.
Generally, see K McNeil, ‘Judicial Approaches to Self-Government since
Calder: Searching for Doctrinal Coherence’ in H Foster, H Raven and J Webber
(eds), Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of
Indigenous Rights (UBC Press, 2007) 129. In R v Pamajewon [1996] 2 SCR 821
the Court held that holding a bingo without a provincial license did not fall
under a right of self-government, and left open the question of whether such a
right could exist. Other cases have suggested that First Nations have authority
over Aboriginal title land (Delgamuukw v British Columbia [1997] 3 SCR
1010), and treaty rights (Marshall v Canada [1999] 3 SCR 533), without
specifically finding that a right of self-government existed.
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136,000 square miles of land for the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic to 2.7
square miles for Tsawwassen in British Columbia.38
While all of these agreements contain a self-government
component, the Nisga’a Agreement of British Columbia is among those
that go the furthest, by giving the self- government powers constitutional
status. Because the rights contained in the Nisga’a Agreement are section
35(1) ‘treaty rights’, ordinary legislation cannot derogate from them. They
thus enjoy much greater protection than self-government rights in the
United States, where Congress has plenary power to derogate from tribal
authorities. However, the extent of Nisga’a jurisdiction is considerably
more restricted than that of the Navajo in the United States, or even than
that envisaged by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. Nisga’a
authority is paramount over some internal matters, including Nisga’a
government and constitution,39 Nisga’a citizenship,40 culture and
language,41 Nisga’a property,42 use of Nisga’a lands,43 child and family
services,44 education,45 and cultural property.46 In other areas, the
provincial or federal government laws are either paramount (eg, health
services and intoxicants), or are exclusive (eg, criminal law). As for
adjudication of disputes, the Agreement provides for the creation of a
Nisga’a court if provincial approval is obtained,47 but any appeals must be
taken to Supreme Court of British Columbia.48 Finally, the form of
government does not look radically different from Indian Act’s Band
Councils.

38

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

For a more detailed description of some of these agreements, see S Imai,
‘Aboriginal Land Claims’ in Handbook of North American Indians, vol 2
(Smithsonian Institution, 2008) 177-84. See also the Department of Indian and
Northern Affairs (www.ainc-inac.gc.ca) and the British Columbia Treaty
Commission (www.bctreaty.net).
Nisga’a Final Agreement (Canada, British Columbia, Nisga’a Nation, 1998) ch
11, s 34.
Ibid, ch 11, s 39.
Ibid, s 41.
Ibid, s 44.
Ibid, s 47.
Ibid, s 89.
Ibid, ss 100, 103.
Ibid, s 115.
Ibid, s 36.
Ibid, ch 12, s 45.
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3. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
The courts in Australia and New Zealand have traditionally not recognized
any sovereignty for Indigenous people. In fact, in 1971 an Australian case,
Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty. Ltd.49 decided that, as a matter of law, Australia
was terra nullius when the first settlers arrived. That is, the land was
empty. Far from recognizing any rights to land or self-government, the
Court found that the Aborigines did not even exist as people with rights. It
was not until 1992, that the High Court in Mabo reversed this decision and
recognized the existence of native title in Australia.50 In New Zealand, the
existence of Māori sovereignty turns on the meaning of the 1840 Treaty of
Waitangi. The Māori version of the treaty states that the Māori retained
tino rangatiratanga over their taonga, which roughly translates to
sovereignty over their treasures. The English version of the Treaty states
that Māori ceded all of their sovereignty to the British Crown. While there
was a period when the Treaty was completely ignored, courts and
government have now begun to recognize some Māori interests in relation
to land and resources.51 However, in neither country have courts
recognized sovereignty in the way that courts in the United States have. As
a consequence of the hostile judicial environment, in neither country have
land settlements with Indigenous people resulted in the combination of
land and jurisdiction that has characterized policy toward American tribes
and recent Canadian land claims settlements.
Nonetheless, sovereignty is part of the political vocabulary of
Australian Indigenous people and Māori. In Australia, in the late 1980’s
during the debates on negotiating a modern treaty, some Aboriginal
leaders suggested that Aboriginal Australians should seek full
independence as a country.52 This idea does not appear to have gained
much traction, but there is interest in looking for a new arrangement
within Australia. Will Sanders argues that Indigenous people in Australia
have jurisdiction to make their own laws and that they represent ‘a
49
50
51
52

Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd. (1971) 17 FLR 141. See also Coe v
Commonwealth (1979) 53 ALJR 403.
Mabo v State of Queensland (No 2) (1992) 107 ALR 1 (HC). See the chapter by
Kent McNeil for a fuller discussion.
See Bourassa and Strong, above n 11.
N Pearson, ‘Reconciliation: To Be or Not To Be - A Separate Aboriginal
Nationhood or Aboriginal Self-determination and Self-government Within the
Australian Nation?’ [1993] Aboriginal Law Bulletin 12.
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repressed third order within Australian government, alongside the State
and Commonwealth orders’.53 Lisa Behrendt suggests that the aspiration
of the treaty would be for ‘internal self-determination’ within the
Australian state:
[t]he rights enmeshed in the concept of ‘self-determination’
include, I would argue, everything from the right not to be
discriminated against, to the rights to enjoy language,
culture and heritage, our rights to land, seas, waters and
natural resources, the right to be educated and to work, the
right to be economically self sufficient, the right to be
involved in decision-making processes that impact upon
our lives and the right to govern and manage our own
affairs and our communities.54
Similarly, Andrea Tunks from Aotearoa/New Zealand states flatly,
‘[s]ecession is not at the forefront of Māori aspirations’.55 She sees the
Treaty of Waitangi as recognizing the existence of a parallel Māori lawmaking authority:
Minimally, it would enable hapu [tribes] and iwi [tribal
confederations] to exercise law-making power in respect of
their territories, resources and their own members. It may
also include an ability for pan-tribal structures to gather
separate tribal nations into one decision-making entity so
that the relationship with Crown kawantanga
[governmental authority] and non-Māori can be continually
negotiated.56

53

54

55

56

W Sanders, ‘Towards an Indigenous Order of Australian Government:
Rethinking Self-determination as Indigenous Affairs Policy’, Discussion Paper
No 230/2002 (Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, University of
New South Wales, 2002).
L Behrendt, ‘Unfinished Journey - Indigenous Self Determination’ (2002) 58
Arena Magazine 24, 27.
A Tunks, ‘Pushing the Sovereign Boundaries in Aotearoa’ [1999] Indigenous
Law Bulletin 69, text at fn 34.
Ibid.
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B. SELF-ADMINISTRATION AND SELF-MANAGEMENT
In these arrangements the Indigenous community does not exercise
inherent authority. They derive their powers from, and are limited by,
settler government legislation and policies. The most advanced variation
of this model includes a land base. These variations usually include
powers for Indigenous institutions to make by-laws over local matters.
Where there is no land base, there can be a transfer of a government
program and attendant funding to an Indigenous organization. These selfadministration and self-management initiatives have brought significant
benefits by way of control over funding and the potential for more
appropriate service delivery. However, they have been criticized for being
a poor replacement for true self-government or sovereignty.57
1. SELF-ADMINISTRATION ON A LAND BASE
The Indian Act regulates most Canadian Indians.58 This statute has the
dual purpose of shielding Indians from the settlers, but also promoting
eventual assimilation. It set aside reserves for Indian communities and
shields the land from being sold off piecemeal, by requiring that
communities consent to the ‘surrender’ of the land.59 The Act sets out
rules for a wide variety of matters including membership, education, land
use, wills and taxation. The Indian Act also gives the government almost
complete control over the day-to-day functioning of the elected Band
Council. For example, the government has imposed western style elections
on Bands, thereby displacing traditional governance structures. Although
the Act gives Band Councils authority to make by-laws, the subject matter
is limited to local issues, such as consumption of alcohol and residence on
the reserve. Even with this limited jurisdiction, the Minister of Indian
57
58
59

See eg, Cornell, above n 13, 10-11.
Indian Act, 1876, RSC 1985, c I-5.
The land set aside for Indian reserves in a fifty- year period beginning in the mid
1800's was minuscule compared to American standards. All the reserves in
Canada put together would have been less than one half of the size of the Navajo
reserve alone. See Royal Commission, Report, above n 3, Vol 2, Pt. 1, 422-23.
Modern land claims agreements beginning in the mid-seventies, described
above, have increased the total amount of land under the jurisdiction of
Aboriginal people in Canada.
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Affairs can disallow any Band Council by-law.60 At the present time, only
a small minority of First Nations have succeeded in negotiating the self
government arrangements discussed earlier in this chapter that have freed
them from the Indian Act.
Canada=s Métis are recognized as having self-administration
powers only in the Province of Alberta where they have a similar type of
arrangement to the Indian Act. The Métis Settlements Act established
eight communities with governing bodies that can make local decisions.61
The Indian Bands and the Métis Settlement Councils receive
government funding to administer their reserves and settlements. They are
also eligible to receive funds to deliver social services and economic
development projects. In this, they are similar to American tribes who
administer quite a range of federal programs through the Indian Selfdetermination and Education Assistance Act.62
In Australia, the Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander) Act 200663 permits Aboriginal groups to create their own
associations related to business, to land councils and town councils. Over
three thousand entities have been created under this Act.64 The powers of
these associations vary, depending on what State or federal statute
provided them with jurisdiction, but in all cases, the authority to make
laws is more limited than the authority delegated to Canadian Indian
Bands.65 For example, in the Northern Territory, Land Councils under
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 are empowered to
consult with landowners and negotiate land issues. The only regulatory
powers they can exercise however, are, with the permission of the
appropriate Minister, functions set out in the law of the Territorial
government relating to (a) the protection of sacred sites; (b) access to
Aboriginal land; and (c) schemes for the management of wildlife on
60
61

62
63
64
65

For a general description, see Imai, Handbook, above n 18, chs 8-10.
C Bell, Alberta's Métis Settlement Legislation: An Overview of Ownership and
Management of Settlement Lands (Canadian Plains Research Center, University
of Regina, 1994).
Indian Self-determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub L No 93-638, 88
Stat 203 (1975).
Corporations (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander) Act 2006 (Cth); formerly
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (Cth).
T Anthony, ‘Aboriginal Self-determination after ATSIC: Reappropriation of the
“Original Position”’ (2005) 14 Polemic 4, 6.
See Nettheim, et al, above n 7, 237-317.
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Aboriginal land.66 Indigenous communities in the Northern Territory can
also carry out some local administrative functions if they are approved
under the Local Government Act. Under this statute, a Council has power
to make by-laws over a very limited number of local issues including
alcohol consumption, the destruction of animals and issuing of licenses.67
2. SELF-ADMINISTRATION OFF A LAND BASE
Traditionally non-Indigenous people administered social services and
economic development project in Indigenous communities. There are
many horror stories from past years, ranging from the indiscriminate
‘scooping’ of Indigenous children by over zealous child welfare agencies
to the imposition of economic ‘development’ schemes that only benefited
non-Indigenous developers. The decisions taken in the 1970´s and 1980´s
to transfer the administration of these programs to Indigenous people
themselves would appear to be a good thing. There are critiques, however,
that programs designed by non- Indigenous people, will not be necessarily
be appropriate or even feasible, in Indigenous communities.68
An example that shows both the strengths and weaknesses of the
self-administration model is the Aboriginal and Torres Straight Island
Commission (ATSIC) of Australia. This organization was established in
1990 in response to the demand for ‘self-determination’. It was composed
of an eighteen member Board of Commissioners who were elected from
35 Aboriginal Regional Councils. It was established to provide advice to
the government on issues affecting Aboriginal people and to assist
Aboriginal communities.69 At its height, it provided vigorous advocacy
and brought Australian issues to international fora. On the domestic front,
ATSIC was involved in the delivery of a variety of funding programs in
the arts, Indigenous rights, housing, economic development and legal
services.70 Although ATSIC played an impressive role in the Australian
political landscape, there were problems with the design. Some critics said
that ATSIC was too focused on addressing disadvantage of Aboriginal
individuals, rather than pursuing self-government goals such as land
66
67
68
69
70

Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) s 23(2).
Local Government Act 1994 (NT) ss 182-201.
Imai, Handbook, above n 18, 182-83.
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) s 7.
The ATSIC web site is now closed, but some pages are archived at:
pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/41033/20060106-0000/ATSIC/default.html.
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claims. Other critics noted that federal government control over the
organization and its activities was very tight. The employees were not
hired directly by ATSIC, but rather through the federal bureaucracy; for
the first decade, the Chair was appointed by the government; and almost
all of the programs were delivered under guidelines provided in Australian
legislation. Consequently, in spite of the fact that the leadership of ATSIC
was Aboriginal, the organization itself was criticized for being too ‘white’.
In addition, there were internal challenges. The elected Board of
Commissioners were said to be too involved in decision-making on
funding, leading to charges of favouritism. As a consequence, in 2003, the
service delivery functions were transferred to the Aboriginal and Torres
Straight Islander Services. The political vulnerability of an Indigenous
government structure based on delegated authority was illustrated when, in
2005, a conservative Australian government shut down the organization
and transferred the service delivery options to other institutions and
government departments.71
In spite of these critiques, in urban settings, self- administration
may provide a valuable vehicle for Indigenous people. The urban
populations are significant. In New Zealand, over 85 per cent of the Māori
live in urban centres;72 in the United States about 67 per cent live off
reservations and half in urban centres73; in Australia, about 30 per cent of
Aborigines live in major urban areas74 and almost half live in urban areas
in Canada.75 People living in non-Indigenous areas do not have an
exclusive land base, and the communities are often fragmented, as
individuals have different degrees of identification with their indigeneity.76
Although there are calls for >self-determination for urban Indians=,77 such
self-determination must result in arrangements that are different from
71
72
73
74
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76
77

See Nettheim et al, above n 7, 379 -81. See general critiques by Anthony, above
n 64.
Durie, above n 16, 55.
Harvard Project, above n 7, 321-66.
From Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Australia, drawing on
2001 statistics: www.hreoc.gov.au/Social_Justice/statistics/index.html#fn28,
drawn from ABS stats.
Statistics
Canada:
www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/Products/Analytic/companion/abor/canada.
cfm#6.
See Durie, above n 16, 95 (discussing alienation of urban Māori from traditional
iwi).
Harvard Project, above n 7, 359.
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communities with a land base. Rather than beginning with an identifiable
community and a geographical location, the project might build up from
the services that are used by Indigenous people such as education,
community centres, housing, employment training or child welfare. The
institutions providing the services could facilitate participation by
Indigenous people through reserving seats on the board of directors or
establishing liaison or advisory committees. In addition, where numbers
warrant, Indigenous people themselves could be funded to run some
services. In the city of Toronto, Canada, where there is an Indigenous
population of perhaps 60,000, there are many Indigenous-specific services
run by Indigenous peoples, including two community centres, a cooperative housing project, an elementary school, a legal aid clinic, a
library, a health clinic, a men=s residence, a senior=s residence and a child
welfare agency.78 In the best of these models, the Aboriginal people not
only deliver the service, they also play important roles in the design and
decision-making.
It may be possible to go a step further by co-ordinating all of these
services under an umbrella organization. This is the form of selfgovernment suggested by Canada=s Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples, called ‘communities of interest’.79 In this model, Indigenous
people would centralize the delivery of services and provide a structure for
advocating for their members. It is similar to the Australian ATSIC model:
an elected Indigenous body involved in service delivery and advocacy. To
my knowledge, outside of Australia, no group has been able to implement
this model for urban self-government.

C. CO-MANAGEMENT AND JOINT MANAGEMENT
The areas of land that are reserved or set aside for the exclusive use of
Indigenous people is often not large enough to provide the support
necessary for traditional ceremonial and sustenance activities, let alone for
modern day economic pursuits that will provide an economic base for the
communities. Indigenous peoples need access to, and control over, the
land and resources, not only in their small exclusive use areas, but also in
78
79

Imai, above n 18, 187-88.
Royal Commission, Report, above n 3, Vol 4, 519-622.
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the larger land and resource base that they have traditionally accessed to
survive.
It is difficult to measure whether or not there has been ‘progress’
on the lands issue over the years. Certainly, in Canada, Australia and New
Zealand, the situation has improved, in that governments in all three
jurisdictions have said that they are committed to addressing issues of land
and resources. Kent McNeil’s chapter on land rights in this reader shows
that there have been advances in recognizing title for Indigenous groups,
including the recognition in both international law and domestic law, that
governments must consult with Indigenous peoples before taking away
Indigenous access to lands or resources. On the other hand, this is the area
where Indigenous people encounter the greatest pressure to assimilate.
Mining, gas and oil, forestry, agriculture, hydro-electric power generation,
settlement: they can all combine to create a rationale for pursuing a ‘public
good’ that results in the transfer of the ownership and management of
lands from the Indigenous inhabitants to the settler governments. Physical
confrontations over land continue in Canada, the United States, Australia
and New Zealand, resulting in road blockades and land occupations.80
Gordon Christie is critical of the imposition of a dominant
vocabulary on the issues:
While pre-existing Aboriginal interests may be transformed
into proprietary, or quasi-proprietary rights, Aboriginal
sovereignty is removed from the scene at the point of the
assertion of Crown sovereignty (replaced with, at most, the
notion of ‘self-government’ - another construct within
domestic Canadian law). The Crown is charged exclusively
with the task of deciding how land is to be thought of, and
how this translates into how land is used. Vital Aboriginal
interest, those which exist today as ‘unsettled’ claims, are
to be replaced with ‘rights’ and ‘title’, constructs
essentially unrelated to these vital interests, and distanced
from Aboriginal sovereignty. These constructs are
grounded in non-Aboriginal visions - state visions - of
interests Aboriginal nations might have in their lands, non80

For a thoughtful report following the shooting death of an Aboriginal protester
by the police, see Ontario Government, Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry
(Publications Ontario, 2007).
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The question then, is not only a question of law. In Canada, at least, some
First Nations were better off not having any recognized rights in law, but
having control and use of their resources in fact. The coming of legal
recognition has been accompanied by an invasion of their lands and an
expropriation of their resources.
The obligation to ‘consult’ with Indigenous communities is
certainly an improvement over the past, when no consultation was
necessary. However, settler governments are loath to acknowledge that
Indigenous ‘consent’ is required. This means that no matter how elaborate
the consultation process, courts and governments do not recognize the
community’s right to say ‘no’. Recently in Ontario, Canada, the
Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug were involved in a dispute in the bush
hundreds of miles from any road, in an area accessible only by plane and
skidoo. The First Nation objected to exploration activity on territory over
which it still retained rights to hunt and fish. A court ordered the First
Nation to participate in a ‘consultation’ with the company, Platinex.
Throughout the consultation, the First Nation insisted that it intended to
follow its own protocols before deciding whether to permit further
exploration. After some months had passed, the judge decided that the
First Nation’s right to be consulted had been fulfilled. When the First
Nation continued to block exploration activity, the judge found that the
Chief and the majority of the members of the elected council were guilty
of contempt of court and he sentenced them to six months in jail.82 It was
the longest sentence that people could remember for a contempt of court
arising from protest actions.83 As for precedents, no examples come to
mind of an entire mayor and council of a non-Aboriginal municipality
81
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G Christie, ‘A Colonial Reading of Recent Jurisprudence: Sparrow,
Delgamuukw and Haida Nation’ (2005) 3 Windsor Yearbook of Access to
Justice 17, 46.
Platinex Inc v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation [2008] 2 CNLR 201
(Ont Sup Ct).
See Frontenac Ventures Corp v Ardoch Algonquin First Nation [2008] OJ 2651
(Ont CA) para 63. In this case, the trial judge had imposed a sentence of six
months and a fine of C$25,000 to former Chief for blocking a uranium mine on
disputed land. The Ontario Court of Appeal found the sentence much too harsh
and reduced it to a C$1000 fine.
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being jailed over a dispute over land use. To exacerbate matters, Platinex
was not an innocent, well-meaning resource company. Although the
company had received a letter from the First Nation objecting to the
exploration activity, in their public listing they said that the Band had
verbally consented to the exploration.84 When the Band physically
prevented the exploration activity, Platinex sued for over C$10 billion.
That was about C$10 million for every man, woman and child on this
isolated reserve.
A softer way for governments to access Indigenous lands is
through co-management regimes. In the typical case, a commission or
board is established with Indigenous and government appointees. The idea
is that this type of structure will facilitate a collaborative relationship that
embeds Indigenous participation. Canada uses co-management boards
extensively and they are an important feature of all land claims
agreements.85 The jurisdiction and composition of each board depends on
the land claims agreement. An example is found in the Nunavut Land
Claims Agreement.86 A number of wildlife management, resource
management and environmental boards are established to provide Inuit
with a formal role in making recommendations to government decisionmakers. These include the Nunavut Planning Commission, the Nunavut
Water Board, the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board and the Surface
Rights Tribunal. The Boards are generally composed of the same number
of representatives from the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut as from the
federal and territorial governments. Since Inuit will dominate the
territorial government, the majority of the members of a Board may be
Inuit people. For the most part, the decisions of the co-management bodies
remain advisory opinions for a government Minister, who will make the
final decision. Nonetheless, the Agreement makes it more difficult to
84
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Platinex Inc v Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation [2006] 4 CNLR 152
(Ont Sup Ct) paras 23-28. The trial judge’s decision was overturned after the
leaders of the First Nation had spent over two months in jail: Platinex Inc v
Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug First Nation [2008] OJ No 2650 (Ont CA).
For a general discussion, see Royal Commission, Report, above n 3, Vol 2 Pt 2,
665-80. For American examples, see E Goodman, ‘Protecting Habitat for Offreservation Tribal Hunting and Fishing Rights: Tribal Comanagement as a
Reserved Right’ (2000) 30 Environmental Law 279.
Agreement between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty
the Queen in Right of Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development and Tungavik, 1993) (‘Nunavut Land Claims Agreement’).
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ignore the advice of the co-management board. The structured decisionmaking in the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board is illustrative. The
Board is the main instrument for wildlife management in the Nunavut
Settlement Area and the main regulator of access to wildlife. The purpose
of the Board is to create a system of harvesting rights and, priorities and
privileges that reflect current and traditional Inuit harvesting. When the
Board makes a decision, it is to convey the decision privately to the
Minister. If the Minister decides to reject the advice of the Board, the
Minister must give his or her decision in writing within 30 days and permit
the Board to reconsider its decision. The Board will then reconsider the
matter and make its decision publicly. At that point, the Minister is again
in a position to accept the decision of the Board or reject the decision of
the Board.87
In some cases, however, the Boards have more significant
authority. The Nunavut Impact Review Board is the environmental
assessment agency for the Nunavut Settlement Area. The Board examines
the impact of project proposals on the land, air and water, and on the
people of the Nunavut Settlement Area. They rely on traditional Inuit
knowledge and recognized scientific methods to assess and monitor the
environmental, cultural and socioeconomic impacts of proposals. The
Board determines whether project proposals should proceed to
development and, if so, under what conditions. If the Board decides that a
development proposal needs to be reviewed, the Minister is required to
refer the matter to a federal environmental assessment panel for
socioeconomic and ecosystem impacts.88
In Australia, there have been extensive negotiations over joint
management of parks. The individual arrangements vary, but they all have
two elements in common: Indigenous participation on a board that
manages the park, and lease payments to the local Indigenous community.
A typical agreement relates to the Uluru-Kata Tjuta National Park. The
Anangu were granted title deeds to the park and they leased the land back
to Parks Australia for 99 years. The lease agreement ‘encourages the
maintenance of Anangu tradition through protection of sacred sites and
other areas of significance’. The Anangu are to have a majority on the
Board of Management, receive annual rental payments, and benefit from
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Ibid, art 5.
Ibid, art 12.
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training and employment opportunities.89 A similar initiative exists in
Aotearoa/New Zealand, where there have been negotiations over three
sacred mountains. Māori have been provided a role in the management of
the mountains, although Jacinta Ruru feels it falls short of the type of comanagement that exists over some parks in Australia.90
The co-management or joint management arrangements can bring
benefits to Indigenous people, but usually, the scope of their powers is so
limited that they fall well short of recognizing Indigenous jurisdiction over
their traditional lands.

D. PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC GOVERNMENT
Two of the models that I have discussed so far, sovereignty and selfgovernment and self-administration, and self-management, involve the
creation of institutions that are run by Indigenous people to serve
Indigenous people. Self-determination could also take a direction that
incorporates participation in the mainstream political system. There are
three main variants to this model.
1. GUARANTEED SEATS IN PARLIAMENT
In 1867, New Zealand set aside four seats for Māori in the Parliament.
Voters choose whether to be on the ‘Māori roll’ or on the general roll.
Those who decide to be on the Māori roll vote for a representative in one
of four Māori districts. In the 1996 elections, a partly Māori party, New
Zealand First, took all the Māori seats. The Māori vote was diverse
however, and there were fifteen members of Parliament representing a
cross section of the political spectrum.91 Nonetheless, there have always
89
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See Australian Department of the Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts at
www.environment.gov.au/parks/national-parks.html. Generally, see D Craig,
‘Indigenous Joint Management of National Parks’ [1999] Australian Indigenous
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been doubts about the extent to which the sitting members represented
distinctly Māori i interests. This is because the mainstream political parties
have ran candidates for the Māori seats so that the sitting members owed
their first loyalty to the party, not to their constituents. The issue came to a
head in 2004, when the Labour government enacted legislation that
overturned a court decision and purported to extinguish Māori rights on
the foreshore and seabed. The measures were strongly opposed by many
Māori and there were marches against the legislation. The members sitting
in the Māori seats were all members of the Labour party and they were
told to vote with the government or face sanctions. One member decided
to resign and went on to found the Māori Party. By the 2005 election,
changes to the election laws resulted in seven Māori seats. The Māori
Party took four of them, with the remaining three going to Labour.92
New Zealand is the only country with seats set aside for
Indigenous voters. In Canada, the Electoral Reform Commission decided
against this model and opted instead to recommend that electoral
boundaries be adjusted to create ridings with higher concentrations of
Aboriginal people.93 The federal government did not adopt this
recommendation.
2. PUBLIC GOVERNMENT
In Canada’s North, the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic succeeded in creating a
new Territory called Nunavut. They have opted for a ‘public government’
model in which all residents of the territory, whether Inuit or not, may vote
in territorial elections. Presently, the Inuit constitute a majority in this
territory and therefore will have control. However, the government itself is
structured as a territorial government exercising powers delegated by the
federal government. This means that the Inuit will enjoy the full range of
services and jurisdictions available to other territorial governments, but
that they will also be bound by conventional institutional structures.94
The Inuit in Nunavut have protected their own rights in a separate
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement that establishes their ownership to land
and ice as well as harvesting rights. I have already described the co92
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management aspects of this agreement. What you have in the result, is a
publicly elected territorial government that is largely Inuit, presiding over
land that is partly under the mainstream regime and partly under a land
claims agreement that preserves rights for Inuit. If the population balance
shifts toward non-Inuit in the future, there may be danger of diluting the
Inuit influence. On the other hand, this model may provide the means for
an organic way to incorporate changing demographics.
3. ELECTED INDIGENOUS PARLIAMENT
The three Scandinavian countries have Parliaments for the Sami people.
The Sami are Indigenous people who live in the northern parts of Finland,
Sweden, Norway and Russia. They number 75,000-100,000. They have
traditionally been associated with reindeer husbandry and it is still an
important component for many Sami. The Parliaments were established
first in Finland (1972), followed by Norway (1989) and Sweden (1993).
Although they are called Parliaments, the number of elected members is
small, consisting of 20-30 representatives. In Norway, the mainstream
parties run candidates for the elections whereas in Sweden, there are
Indigenous parties who put up candidates. These Parliaments do not have
law-making power, but serve to advise government on issues of concern to
Sami and have responsibility for some program funding.
The Scandinavian Parliaments have been criticized for being
ineffective. In fact, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples flatly
stated ‘[s]imply put, the Sami Parliaments lack clout’.95 The Royal
Commission favoured the concept of a separate legislative body for
Aboriginal peoples and recommended the establishment of a third
chamber of Parliament called the House of First Peoples. Unlike the
Scandinavian models, this chamber would have the ability to initiate
legislation as well as providing ‘advice to the House of Commons and the
Senate on legislation and constitutional matters relating to Aboriginal
peoples.96
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IV. PROCESS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
Up to this point, we have discussed self-determination mostly in the
context of the relationship between an Indigenous community and the
nation-state in which they live. We have looked at how the models differ,
depending on the degree to which the Indigenous community can act
independently of state legislation. In this section, I will touch on issues
that are important internally for the Indigenous community itself: the
process for implementation; what constitutes the community; what
accountability mechanisms will control the Indigenous authority; and the
importance of addressing the interests of women. The settler governments
have a role in ensuring a smooth transition toward the exercise of greater
self-determination in all these areas, but must act in a way that respects the
autonomy of the community.

A. COMMUNITY-BASED PROCESS
One thing that must be clear from earlier chapters of this reader is that
imposed solutions concocted by non- Indigenous social engineers will not
work. Even the most well-meaning individuals can trigger disastrous
social consequences. The only sensible process is one that involves the
Indigenous community in the conceptualization, design and execution of
the initiative. It is important for the community to be given the space and
time to identify its needs, its priorities and the way in which it wishes to
proceed. The proposals put forward by the community may not fit neatly
into the bureaucratic boxes created by government departments. But that is
the challenge that progressive governments must take up.97
When I worked for the Ministry of the Attorney General, we
funded a community justice initiative on an Indian reserve. Some months
into the project, the reserve justice committee heard from teachers that
children from a particular family were arriving hungry at school. Rather
than sanctioning the parents or apprehending the children, the justice
committee decided to run a bingo to raise money for a lunch program for
all of the children in this school. This caused some consternation within
the Ministry because it appeared that the justice project had become
97
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involved in areas that should perhaps be in the domain of the Ministry of
Family Services or the Ministry of Education. Some bureaucrats wondered
whether the Ministry of the Attorney General should continue funding the
program. This may seem like a trivial issue but it is real, as anyone who
has worked in government can attest, and the internal bureaucratic
dynamics can have devastating impacts on projects on the ground.
For lawyers, especially, the importance of understanding a
community-based approach is crucial. Law students are generally given
the impression that law is a system of rules and the role of lawyers is to
apply those rules with as much precision as possible. The focus is on the
rule and what courts or legislatures have said about the rule. But in
working with Indigenous communities, the rule-based focus can lead to
bizarre results, such as the fight over the provincial-federal boundary in
the story that opened this chapter. In the community lawyering approach,
the focus is on how law interacts with the community as a whole.
Christina Zuni Cruz makes the connection between community lawyering
and self-determination in her work with the Isleta Pueblo:
Successful community lawyering has just as much to do
with process as it does with outcome, and when one values
community, process becomes critical. Process is critical
because for native peoples, community lawyering is about
self-determination, both for the community and the
individual, about recognizing traditional norms and
practices, and about valuing relationships.98

B. WHO IS THE ‘COMMUNITY’ OR THE ‘NATION’?
Forced migration, urbanization and internal social dynamics have
splintered Indigenous communities in many ways so that today, many do
not conform to historical or ‘traditional’ groupings. For government, it is
sometimes difficult to know who represents what constituency. For
98
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communities there is a danger that a purported ‘leader’ may not be
mandated to speak for that community.
The New Zealand Law Commission has addressed this issue in its
report, Waka Umanga: A Proposed Law for Maori Governance.99 The two
main political units among Māori are the hapu (tribe) and iwi (tribal
confederation), but there are also many urban Māori who do not identify
with any particular iwi. The law has recognized that Māori collectivities
have interests in communal assets, but the legal or social personality of the
group holding those assets is not clear. Māori collectivities had been using
a variety of existing vehicles, such as corporations and trusts, in order to
interact with the mainstream legal system but these vehicles were an
awkward fit. In order to provide more certainty in this area, both for the
government and for the Māori themselves, the Commission recommended
creating a special corporate vehicle called the waka umanga, which would
have some of the characteristics of a corporation but which would leave
most of the internal arrangements to a charter developed by the Māori
collectivity. It is interesting to see the approach the Law Commission has
taken to determine how the waka umanga would be established. They
regarded the hapu as the basic unit and suggested that there should be at
least fifty members for the group to be viable.
... A viable hapu being one that can respectably manage
customary requirements in welcoming, feeding and bedding
other tribal groups. That probably requires an active and
local membership of at least 50, as nowadays all are not
available for every event. 100
The Law Commission recommended that fifteen people could propose or
oppose the creation of a waka umanga and that disputes can be taken to
the Māori Land Court, which has expertise on Māori issues. Initially, those
that get together to make or oppose the waka umanga determine the
membership of the group. Outside of the requirement for the minimum
size of a hapu, there are no imposed criteria. The Law Commission stated
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that ‘it is the right of a tribe to determine its own membership and
membership rules’.101
The Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples also
turned its mind to the process for the creation of nations that would have a
land base and self-governing jurisdiction. In order to move toward a model
that was closer to the American situation, Canada’s six hundred or so
Bands created under the Indian Act would need to be reconstituted as
larger nations based on traditional affiliations numbering 50-80.102 These
larger nations would hold the inherent right to self-government. The
Commission suggested that a charter group, a group of Bands currently
recognized under the Indian Act, for example, would hold a referendum to
determine whether to proceed toward self-government. This group would
then develop a constitution and membership criteria that were inclusive of
those historically excluded by the membership criteria of the Indian Act.
Membership would not depend on blood quantum. It is contemplated that
there would be wide consultation with the larger membership. In order to
be recognized the constitution and membership criteria would be presented
to a Recognition Panel, composed of a majority of Aboriginal people.103
The flexibility suggested by the New Zealand and Canadian reports
is important. Stephen Cornell says:
the best way to avoid the one-size-fits-all recipe for failure
is to let Indigenous peoples decide for themselves who the
appropriate self in self-governance is and how selfgoverning institutions should be structured—and to accept
the variety of relationships and governance solutions that
will surely result. This is what self-determination means.
Furthermore, not only is outsider decision-making in this
regard the antithesis of self-determination, but neither
collective units nor governing institutions that are imposed
by outside authorities are likely to command the respect or
allegiance of the peoples on whom they are imposed—
which means they will not work.104
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C. ACCOUNTABILITY OF INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENT AND THE
ROLE OF COURTS
There is some controversy on how to ensure that an Indigenous governing
body should be made accountable to its own citizens and how it should
adhere to human rights standards. Some Indigenous leaders have
expressed concern that merely applying civil liberties law from the
common law systems would import a set of criteria based on western
individualistic values that are incompatible with Indigenous forms of
organization.105 For example, the importance of collectivity and communal
ownership of land for Indigenous people would be different from the
concepts of private property enshrined in the American Bill of Rights. It
has been noted earlier that United States Congress enacted the ‘Indian Bill
of Rights’ in the Indian Civil Rights Act because the Bill of Rights in the
American constitution did not apply to the tribes. The enactment of this
statute was not universally welcome. Domingo Montoya, a Pueblo leader,
wanted to be exempt from its application, saying ‘[o]ur deep concern over
the Indian Bill of Rights stems from our fear that it will destroy the
traditions - and in doing so greatly weaken our governments’.106
Nonetheless, in every jurisdiction, there are imposed limits on Indigenous
governments. Every self government agreement in Canada states that the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies to that Aboriginal government,
although there are provisions for ensuring that the impact is softened
where the application of individual rights would derogate from Aboriginal
or treaty rights.107

105

106
107

ME Turpel, ‘Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive
Monopolies, Cultural Differences’ (1989-90) 6 Canadian Human Rights Year
Book 3. For a discussion of the impact of the Indian Civil Rights Act, see K
McNeil, ‘Aboriginal Governments and the Charter: Lessons from the United
States’ (2002) 17 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 73.
Quoted in J Wunder, Retained by the People (Oxford University Press,
1994) 149.
Constitution Act 1982, s 25 reads, in part: ‘[t]he guarantee in this Charter of
certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate
from any aboriginal treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the
aboriginal peoples of Canada…’.

2008]

INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION & THE STATE

35

The courts will have an important role to play in the application of
individual rights standards to Indigenous governments. In this task, the
courts should be sensitive to balancing the interests of individual
Indigenous citizens against the importance of the integrity of the
Indigenous government and the reality of the context of Indigenous
communities. The courts in the United States used the Indian Bill of
Rights to make very interventionist decisions in the first five years after its
enactment, but have since pulled back to give greater rein to Indigenous
sovereignty.108 Undoubtedly, the task of resolving disputes within an
Indigenous community can be challenging for judges. While a mechanical
application of rules established in the common law would yield some sort
of a result, it might not be a result that would be appropriate for the
community. In Canada, Federal Court judges have been developing
jurisprudence on disputes arising from customary selection of Indian Band
leaders. The codes for these elections are created by the Bands themselves
and the procedures for their adoption are often contentious, as disputes
arise around decision-making ‘traditions’ or ‘customs’. The judges have
adapted some general administrative law principles, such as bias and
procedural fairness, taking into account the small size of the communities.
For example, the strict application of ‘conflict of interest’ does not make
sense when there are so many people related to each other.109

D. THE ROLE OF WOMEN
Gender relations in Indigenous communities have been greatly influenced
by gender relations in the larger settler communities. Consequently, during
the time when white women had few rights, the same regime was
enforced, directly or indirectly in Indigenous communities. In Canada, for
example, the Indian Act reflected patriarchal attitudes of the nineteenth
century when women lost much of their independence on marriage. White
women who married Indian men became Indians. On the other hand,
Indian women who married white men, lost their status as Indians. When
women in the settler society began asserting equality rights in the sixties
108
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and seventies, the same occurred in Indigenous communities. Canadian
Indian women waged a successful campaign to repeal the offending
provisions of the Indian Act in 1985.110
The right of women to membership is controversial because it can
run up against the very self-determination right that is being advocated
here. The issue is illustrated in the case of Santa Clara Pueblo v
Martinez.111 The Pueblo tribal law set out that the children of a woman
who married out of the tribe lost their tribal membership. In this case, a
Pueblo woman married a Navajo man and the family continued to live on
the reserve. The mother and a child challenged the law as discriminatory
under the Indian Civil Rights Act because the children of men who
married out of the tribe retained Pueblo membership. The US Supreme
Court held that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to deal with claims under
this statute because, imprisonment aside, enforcement of the statute was a
tribal matter. Author John Wunder hails this decision as an affirmation of
tribal sovereignty.112 Others see this as toleration of sexism within tribal
communities.113
One way to address concerns about discrimination against women
has been to ensure that settler government documents impose gender
equality. The Law Commission report from New Zealand has addressed
the gender issue directly suggesting that, while the right to decide
membership is to be respected, gender discrimination in the waka umanga
should not be permitted.114 In Canada, the Constitution Act, 1982 states
that Aboriginal and treaty rights are ‘guaranteed equally to male and
female persons’.115 Another way to address the concern is to ensure that,
in any transitional period toward new structures or new initiatives, the
interests of women are taken into account in the process. The Royal
110
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Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recommends that all nations ‘ensure
that the participation of women in the creation and design of justice
systems is both meaningful and significant’116
In the end, we must realize that establishing abstract legal
standards or creating inclusive processes do not, by themselves, ensure the
protection of women. There must be a meaningful way, on the ground, to
implement solutions that are effective. The opening story in this chapter
showed how a conflict between the federal and provincial government
stymied attempts by the community to control alcohol abuse. In the United
States, a jurisdictional conflict affects women who experience domestic
violence on tribal lands. Statistics reveal that Indian women experience
very high rates of spousal abuse – 39 per cent have been victims. NonIndian men commit 75 per cent of the abuses. As we have mentioned,
Indian tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over non-Indians, so they are
left powerless. The federal government, which does have jurisdiction, has
not committed funds to enforce federal laws on Indian reserves. Only 30
per cent of all federal crimes on tribal land were prosecuted by federal
attorneys and within that number, domestic assaults are a low priority.
Rebecca Hart and Alexander Lowther argue that the solution lies in
placing greater authority in the hands of the tribes: ‘[t]ribal remedies not
only bolster the sovereignty of tribes, they aid Native American women in
reclaiming self-determination over their bodies’.117

V. CONCLUSION
In this chapter we have reviewed a number of forms of governance that
could result from the exercise of self-determination. Outright
independence apart, the form that gives the greatest autonomy from the
settler government is the United States model where courts have
recognized tribes as ‘domestic dependent nations’. Under the doctrine of
116
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retained sovereignty, tribes generally have power to make laws in all areas
until they have been overridden by an Act of Congress. In Canada, the
recently negotiated self-government agreements, such as the Nisga’a
Agreement recognize that First Nations have an inherent right of selfgovernment. Although the scope of Nisga’a powers is more limited than
the powers of tribes in the United States, the laws that the Nisga’a can
make in relation to some matters are paramount over federal and
provincial laws. Unlike in the United States, the Nisga’a law making
authority is constitutionally protected so that unilateral federal legislation
cannot take away those powers.
Self-administration and self-management models are found in all
four jurisdictions. Indigenous nations receive delegated responsibilities
from federal or state governments to administer services to their
constituents. The most advanced form of this model is found in Canada
under the Indian Act. Indian Bands have reserves set aside and some
power to make local by-laws. Land settlements in Australia and New
Zealand have given limited by-law making authority to Indigenous bodies.
Where there is no land base, the most elaborate model was the Aboriginal
and Torres Straight Island Commission in Australia, which had nationally
elected Aboriginal representatives on its board, and its mandate included
advocating for the interests of the Indigenous people. This model for
service delivery has advantages, especially for Indigenous people living in
urban areas. However, it has been criticized for being too dependent on
non- Indigenous design and implementation, to be entirely satisfactory.
Ownership and control of lands and resources is crucial to the
survival of Indigenous peoples. Some Indigenous communities and nations
do own some resources, especially where there is a recognized land base.
But ownership is not the only issue. Indigenous control and participation
in the stewardship of the resource is also important, and this is most often
accomplished through co-management or joint management structures.
Finally, we have reviewed variations on participation in public
government. In Aotearoa/New Zealand, the reserved seats for Māori have
been a feature of their legislature since 1867. Recently, Inuit of Nunavut
have opted for a public government model combined with reserved rights
set out in a land claims agreement for Inuit. Institutions similar to Sami
Parliaments in Scandinavia have not picked up many adherents in the four
countries studied in this reader.
It is difficult, in the abstract, to judge which is the ‘best’ model.
They all have limitations and advantages for certain constituents. It is
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important to note, however, that a judgment cannot be made simply on
whether the institutions or activities ¨look Indigenous¨. Indigeneity, like
non-indigeneity, changes over time. To understand a society, it is not
appropriate to take a snapshot that freezes relationships and movement at a
particular moment in history. It is more appropriate to think of a video
camera that captures shifting patterns, motion, and temporal texture.
Indigenous people interacting with the non- Indigenous world are
constantly defining Indigeneity, so it is difficult to ‘fix’ on a particular set
of characteristics.
Rather than focusing on outward appearances, it may be more useful
to think of criteria that reflect the dynamic nature of Indigenous
communities and their relationship with the state. I believe that there are at
least three factors to consider in the evaluation of particular choices for
self-determination. The first would be to determine the degree to which
the Indigenous group participated and consented to the arrangement. I
have indicated that wide participation at a community level, including the
active participation of women in the decision-making process is crucial to
success. Second, the arrangement could be judged on the degree to which
the Indigenous people have autonomy to conceptualize, design and
implement their priorities. For example, laws that may work perfectly well
within the mainstream society may not be appropriate in the Indigenous
context. Third, the initiatives adopted should ensure transparency and
accountability within the Indigenous community. This will require a
careful balancing between respecting the autonomy of the Indigenous
collectivity and ensuring that individuals within that collectivity are
treated equitably. To continue the development of Indigenous selfdetermination, then, would involve increased participation, increased
autonomy and increased Indigenous government accountability.
The road ahead is not clear by any means. While there have been
some advances in government policies through court decisions, there have
also been significant setbacks. In Australia, the recommendation for a
national treaty was rejected by the government of the day and the only
nationally elected representative organization for Indigenous people, the
Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Commission, was disbanded in
2005. In Canada, there has been very little follow up by governments on
the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.118
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New Zealand enacted the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 to vest title in
the Crown in order to overturn a court decision that had looked favourably
on Māori interests.119 The US Supreme Court has backtracked on
sovereignty rights and has severely curtailed jurisdiction of tribes over
non-Indians.120 On the international front, it is important to note that the
only four countries to vote against the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples at the United Nations General Assembly in 2007 were
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.
History so far has taught us two things. First, Indigenous people are
not going to disappear. Second, the assimilation policies have been a
dismal failure. Studies, such as that of Chandler that relate selfdetermination to lower suicide rates, and that of the Harvard Project on
American Indian Economic Development, that relate self-determination to
greater economic stability, should impel governments to recognize that
self-determination for Indigenous peoples is the only viable policy for the
years ahead.
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